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FAULT-TOLERANT COMMUNICATION 
CHANNEL STRUCTURES 
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional 
Application No. 601161,697, filed Oct. 26, 1999. 
ORIGIN OF THE INVENTION 
The invention described herein was made in the perfor- 
mance of work under a NASA contract, and is subject to the 
provisions of Public Law 96-517 (35 U.S.C. 202) in which 
the Contractor has elected to retain title. 
BACKGROUND 
This application relates to signal transmission and data 
communication techniques and systems, and more particu- 
larly, to fault-tolerant communication channel structures for 
information systems such as digital electronic systems and 
techniques for implementing the same. 
Information systems generally include multiple informa- 
tion devices that are connected through various communi- 
cation channels so that information can be transmitted from 
one device to another. Each device may be a receiver which 
only receives information from one or more other linked 
devices, a transmitter which only sends information to one 
or more other linked devices, or a transceiver which can 
operate as both a receiver and a transmitter. In the commu- 
nication terminology, such an information system is essen- 
tially a communication network of communication nodes 
that are interconnected by hard-wired or wireless commu- 
nication channels or links, where each node is an informa- 
tion device. 
For example, such an information system or a communi- 
cation network may be a general-purpose digital computer 
system which may include one or more computer proces- 
sors, certain memory units, and various other devices. The 
communication channels in such a system often include 
electronic buses each of which has a collection of conduct- 
ing wires for transmitting information in form of electronic 
signals. Other forms of communication channels may also 
be used, such as a wireless radio-frequency link or an optical 
communication channel which transmits information 
through one or more optical carriers over an optic fiber link 
or a free-space optical link. Another example of an infor- 
mation system is a task-specific computer system such as a 
flight control system for spacecraft or aircraft, which may 
integrate two or more computer systems, one or more 
navigation systems, and other devices together to perform 
complex computations. 
One desirable feature of these systems is the system 
reliability against one or more faults or failures of nodes and 
communication channels in the network. One way to 
achieve such reliability is to make the system “fault-toler- 
ant” so that the system can continue to operate, in the 
presence of faults, to meet the system specification without 
failure of the entire system. Such a fault in a node or a 
communication channel may be caused by software, hard- 
ware, or a combination of both. 
One conventional fault-tolerant system duplicates all 
operations in a particular system. For example, each node 
may be duplicated and the duplicated nodes are used to 
perform the identical operations. Hence, in one implemen- 
tation, when one node fails, one or more other duplicated 
nodes can take over. A voting scheme may also be used to 
produce the output of a node based on outputs of the 
corresponding duplicates. 
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2 
Nodes in a communication system may be linked in a 
number of ways. In one classification, different linking 
configurations may be divided as one-connected-graph sys- 
tems or two or multiple-connected-graph systems. In a 
one-connected-graph system such as a string of nodes in a 
line configuration or certain tree configurations, a commu- 
nication between two nodes can fail due to a single failure 
in a communication link or node. Hence, a single-point 
failure in the network can partition the system and isolate 
one node or a group of nodes from the rest of the system. In 
a two-connected-graph system, at least two separate com- 
munication links or nodes must fail to break the communi- 
cation between two nodes to cause a partition. A ring with 
multiple nodes is one example of a two-connected-graph 
system. 
SUMMARY 
The present disclosure includes systems and techniques 
for implementing fault-tolerant communication channels 
and features in communication systems. Selected commer- 
cial-off-the-shelf devices can be integrated in such systems 
to reduce the cost. 
One embodiment of such a system includes a plurality of 
node devices, each operable to transmit or receive informa- 
tion, and a first set of composite communication links to 
connect the node devices to form a communication network. 
Each composite communication link has at least a first type 
communication channel and a second type, different com- 
munication channel. The communication channels of the 
first type are connected to the nodes to form a first network 
in a first topology. The communication channels of the 
second type are connected to the nodes to form a second 
network in a second, different topology. At least one of the 
first and the second networks is not partitioned when a 
failure occurs. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 shows one embodiment of an avionic system base 
don a fault-tolerant system of the present invention. 
FIG. 2 shows an example of different tree connections in 
a composite fault-tolerant link and its duplicate. 
FIG. 3 shows one embodiment of the commercial-off- 
the-shelf bus architecture fault-tolerance strategy based on a 
multi-level approach. 
FIG. 4 shows an exemplary stack-tree bus topology. 
FIG. 5 shows detailed connections of the system in FIG. 
FIGS. 6A through 6D show exemplary tree structures. 
FIGS. 7A through 7D show exemplary complete stack 
FIGS. SA through SC show one design of backup links. 
FIGS. 9A through 9F illustrate cut-type and non-cut-type 
FIGS. 10A through 1OC illustrate partitioning in a com- 
FIG. 11 shows one example of a fault-tolerant bus net- 
FIGS. 12, 13, and 14 show reliability results for three 
1. 
trees with dual bus designs. 
failures. 
plete-stack-tree bus topology with backup links. 
work. 
different bus networks. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The fault-tolerant systems and techniques of the present 
disclosure include one or more fault-tolerant features based 
on redundancy in the communication channels linking dif- 
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ferent nodes in one-connected-graph communication sys- Assume, for example, one set of communication channels 
tems. Hence, duplication of nodes is not required in the in the primary link may be in an one-connected tree topology 
present systems although such duplication may be combined and accordingly, the duplicated set of communication chan- 
with the redundancy in the communication channels. In nels in the secondary composite link also form a tree 
certain applications, duplication of nodes may not be prac- 5 topology. However, the set of channels and the duplicate set 
tical or feasible because duplicated nodes may increase the of channels connected the nodes differently so that the tree 
physical size, system complexity, power consumption, and position of a particular node in the tree formed in the set of 
cost of a fault-tolerant communication system. One example channels in the primary composite link is different from the 
is a fault-tolerant avionic system for aircraft or spacecraft tree position of that same node in the tree formed in the 
which demands compact system packaging, low power i o  duplicated set of channels in the secondary composite link. 
consumption, and light weight. The present fault-toleration In particular, according to one embodiment, any node may 
features based on redundancy in the communication chan- not be a branch node in both trees in the primary and 
nels may be implemented without duplicating nodes to meet secondary composite links. Instead, a branch node in the tree 
these and other application requirements. formed in the primary composite link may be a leaf node in 
The redundancy in the communication channels for one- 15 another tree formed in the secondary composite link. A leaf 
connected-graph systems may be implemented at two dif- node in one tree, however, may be either a branch node or 
ferent, separate levels. First, composite fault-tolerant links a leaf node in another tree. Hence, a failed node can only 
are constructed to each include at least two communication partition the tree in which it is connected as a branch node 
channels with different link topological configurations and to which other nodes are connected. Because this same node 
are used to interconnect the nodes. Such a composite fault- 20 is a leaf node in the other tree formed by another composite 
tolerant link at the system level will be referred to as “a bus link, the failure of the node only causes the loss of a leaf 
set” when all communication channels in the link are formed node and will not affect other nodes and the tree structure. 
of buses with conducting wires. Hence, at least two inde- FIG. 2 illustrates one exemplary implementation 200 of 
pendent, different link networks coexist to connect the same the above design choice, in which buses 1 and 2 are 
set of nodes in such a system and assist each other to 25 respectively the primary and secondary composite fault- 
increase the fault tolerance of the system. The communica- tolerant links. Only the bus A for the tree in the bus 1 and 
tion channels in each composite fault-tolerant link are the duplicate bus B for another tree in the bus 2 are shown 
selected SO that when a particular node or link fails, at least and another bus and its duplication in the buses 1 and 2 are 
one of the link networks is not partitioned and can bypass omitted. The IEEE 1394 bus may be used to implement the 
that failed node or link to tolerate that particular failure. This 30 buses A and B. 
provides a first level of redundancy. Another feature of the present systems and techniques is 
FIG. 1 &ows One example of an avionic system 100 that that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products may be used 
implements the above composite fault-tolerant links. The to implement or all ofthe communication channels for 
devices in the system 100 include node devices 110 and the composite fault-tolerant links, use of COTS products 
non-node devices 120. At the system level, the node devices 35 may significantly reduce the manufacture and maintenance 
110 are interconnected by the composite fault-tolerant buses, cost in both hardware and software because such products 
each of which includes an IEEE 1394 bus 130 and an I2C are widely available and supported by the commercial 
bus 140. The 1394 buses 130 are used to COnnect the node market. A COTS product, such as the IEEE 1394 and 12C 
devices 110 in a O~~-COnnected tree toPologY. The I2c  bus buses, may be integrated in the present fault-tolerant sys- 
140, however, connects the node devices 110 in a serial 40 tems without changing its OEM characteristics so that the 
multi-doP toPo1 OD. The m ~ ~ n o d e  evices 120 may be benefits of the commercial availability, updates and support 
connected to a node device 110 via suitable subsystem buses can be fully utilized, addition to achieve fault tolerance 
such as PCI, 12c, USB, and others. TWO bus COntrOllerS 132 through the above-described multi-level redundancy in con- 
and 142 are respectively coupled to the buses 130 and 140 figuring the communication channels, the fault tolerance 
to control the bus operations. Control software routines may 45 may be further by using the native fault contain- 
be loaded in the controllers 132 and 142. ment in each COTS product and adding special hardware or 
In another level of redundancy in the C0mmunication software fault-tolerant features. These and other aspects will 
Channels, each composite fault-tolerant link in the system be described with reference to examples in using IEEE 1394 
may be duplicated so that any two immediately-linked nodes and 12c buses to implement the system 100 shown in FIG, 
are connected by at least a primary composite fault-tolerant 50 1, 
link and a secondary composite fault-tolerant link. In opera- 
tion, when the primary composite fault-tolerant link fails, 1. G a ~ r a l  Approach to Integrating COTS Buses 
the secondary composite fault-tolerant link is used by com- One use of the fault protection techniques is fault con- 
municating through one of its two or more communication tainment in devices used in the space exploration. Tradi- 
channels. Hence, this duplication of composite links pro- 55 tionally, a spacecraft is divided into fault containment 
vides at least four independent link networks with two regions. Rigorous design effort is used to ensure no effects 
nodes to improve the fault tolerance of the entire system. other regions. Single-fault tolerance have been implemented 
In addition, the secondary composite fault-tolerant links in various spacecraft designs based on dual redundancy of 
may not be an exact copy of the primary composite fault- 60 fault containment regions. 
tolerant links. Instead, one set of communication channels Integrating COTS products into such a single-fault toler- 
for one particular topology in the primary composite fault- ance system can face certain dificulties. One of the reasons 
tolerant link connect the nodes differently from the dupli- is that COTS are not developed with the same level of 
cated set of communication channels for the same particular rigorous fault tolerance in mind. Hence, there are many 
topology in the secondary composite fault-tolerant link. This 65 fundamental fault tolerance shortcomings in COTS. For 
is another layer of redundancy and can further improve the examples, the commercial VersaModule Eurocard (VME) 
fault tolerance. bus usually does not have the parity bit to check the data and 
different topological configurations to link the same set of of a fault within a containment region will propagate to the 
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address. Another example is the IEEE 1394 bus (cable 2. Overview of the Avionics Architecture in FIG. 1 
implementation) adopts a tree topology in which a single The avionics architecture 100 in FIG. 1 includes a number 
node or link failure will partition the bus. These fundamental of compact PCI based “nodes” 110 connected by a compos- 
weakness can hinder rigorous enforcement of fault contain- ite fault-tolerant system bus. In this particular example, a 
ment. In addition, it is usually difficult to modify COTS 5 “node” 110 can either be a flight computer, a global non- 
products in general. This is in part because the suppliers of volatile mass memory, a subsystem microcontroller, or a 
COTS products generally have no interest to change their science instrument. The fault-tolerant system bus is com- 
design, add any overhead, or sacrifice their performance for prised of two COTS buses, the IEEE 1394 (130) and 12C 
a narrow market of high reliability applications. Also, any (140). Both buses 130 and 140 are multi-master and there- 
modification may render the COTS incompatible with com- i o  fore support symmetric scalable and distributed architec- 
mercial test equipment or software, and therefore can sig- tures. Due to the standard electrical interface and protocol of 
nificantly reduce the economic benefits of COTS. Therefore, the COTS buses, nodes complying with the bus interfaces 
fault tolerance cannot easily be achieved by a single layer of can be added to or removed from the system without 
fault containment regions that contains COTS. impacting the architecture. The capability of each node can 
The COTS-based bus architecture of the system 100 15 also be enhanced by adding circuit boards to the compact 
shown in FIG. 1 uses a multi-level fault protection meth- PCI bus. Some spacecraft functions that are handled by the 
odology to achieve high reliability. The levels of the meth- avionics architecture 100 include: power management and 
odology are described as follows: distribution, autonomous operations for on-board planning, 
Level 1 : Native Fault Containment-most of COTS bus scheduling, autonomous navigation fault-protection, isola- 
standards have some limited fault detection capabilities. 20 tion and recovery, etc., telemetry collection, management 
These capabilities should be exploited as the first line of and downlink spacecraft navigation and control, science 
defense. data storage and on-board science processing, and interfac- 
Level 2: Enhanced Fault Containment-addition layer of ing to numerous device drivers which include both “dumb” 
hardware or software can be used to enhance the fault and “intelligent” device drivers. 
detection, isolation, and recovery capabilities of the native 25 The current commercial IEEE 1394 bus 130 is capable to 
fault containment region. Examples are watchdog timer or transfer data at 100, 200, or 400 Mbps. The IEEE 1394 bus 
additional layer of error checking code. The added fault has two implementations, cable and backplane. The cable 
tolerance mechanisms should not affect the basic COTS implementation has adopted a tree topology and the back- 
functions. This level is also a convenient level to implement plane implementation has a multi-drop bus topology. The 
provisions for fault injections. 30 backplane 1394 bus is in general not widely supported in the 
Level 3: Fault Protection by Component Level Design- commercial industry and thus will not be able to take the full 
Diversity-certain COTS suffer fundamental fault tolerance advantage of COTS. The cable implementation has received 
weakness that may not be simply removed by enhancing the wide commercial support and has better performance than 
native fault protection mechanisms. Such weakness is gen- the backplane implementation. Therefore, the cable imple- 
erally related to single points of failures. One example of 35 mentation has been selected for the system 100 in FIG. 1. 
applying design diversity is the protection of the tree topol- The IEEE 1394 bus has two modes of data transactions, 
ogy of the IEEE 1394 bus. Once the IEEE 1394 bus is the isochronous transaction and the asynchronous transac- 
partitioned by a failed node, no watchdog timer or extra tions. The isochronous transaction guarantees on-time deliv- 
layer of protocol can reconnect the bus. Similar examples ery but does not require acknowledgment, while the asyn- 
include buses using other point-to-point topologies. In order 40 chronous transaction requires acknowledgment but does not 
to compensate for such fundamental shortcomings, comple- guarantee on-time delivery. Isochronous messages are sent 
mentary types of buses may be used to implement this level through “channels” and a node can talk on or listen to more 
of fault protection. In particular, the 12C bus, which has a than one isochronous channel. Each isochronous channel 
multi-drop bus topology, is used in the architecture of the can request and will be allocated a portion of the bus 
svstem 100 to comrmlement the IEEE 1394 fault isolation and 45 bandwidth at the bus initialization. Once everv 125 micro- 
recovery. 
Another example of design-diversity to compensate for 
COTS reliability is the use of flash memory for the Non- 
Volatile Memory in the system 100 in FIG. 1. The flash 
memory can provide adequate storage density but it has been 
observed that a single high energy particle can corrupt an 
entire block in the flash memory. To handle such failure 
mode with error correcting codes alone may not meet the 
reliability requirement. Therefore, in order to compensate 
for this weakness, a more robust but much lower density 
Giant Magnetoresistive RAM (GMRAM) or Ferroelectric 
seconds (called isochronous cycle), each isochronous chan- 
nel has to arbitrate but is guaranteed a time slot to send out 
its isochronous messages. At the beginning of each isoch- 
ronous cycle, the root sends out a cycle start message and 
50 then the isochronous transaction will follow. After the iso- 
chronous transaction is the asynchronous transaction. Asyn- 
chronous message is not guaranteed to be sent within an 
isochronous cycle. Therefore, a node may have to wait a 
number of isochronous cycles before its asynchronous mas- 
55 sage can be sent out. The asynchronous transaction employs 
a fair arbitration scheme, which allows each node to send an 
RAM (FeRAM) may be used to store critical state data asynchronous message only once in each fair arbitration 
instead of the flash memory. cycle. A fair arbitration cycle can span over many isochro- 
Level 4: Fault Protection by System Level Redundancy- nous cycles, depending on how much of each cycle is used 
the Level 3 fault containment regions will be replicated for 60 up by the isochronous transactions and how many nodes are 
system level fault containment. The redundant fault contain- arbitrating for asynchronous transactions. The end of a fair 
ment regions can be either in ready or dormant states, arbitration cycle is signified by an Arbitration Reset Gap. 
depending on the recovery time and other system require- During the bus startup or reset, the IEEE 1394 bus will go 
ments. If they are in ready state, voting or comparison of through an initialization process in which each node will get 
outputs among the regions will provide one more level of 65 a node ID. In addition, the root (cycle master), bus manager, 
fault detection. In either case, the redundant regions are and isochronous resource manager will be elected. The root 
necessary resources for the fault recovery process. mainly is responsible for sending the cycle start message and 
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acts as the central arbitrator for bus requests. The bus 
manager is responsible to acquire and maintain the bus 
topology. The isochronous resource manager is responsible 
for allocating bus bandwidth to isochronous nodes. The root, 
bus manager, and isochronous resource manger are not 
pre-determined, so that any nodes can be elected to take 
these roles as long as they have the capability. 
The 12C bus is a simple bus with a data rate of 100 kbps. 
It has a more traditional multi-drop topology. The 12C bus 
has two open-collector signal lines: a data line (SDA) and a 
clock line (SCL) (not shown). Both signal lines are normally 
pulled high. When a bus transaction begins, the SDA line is 
pulled down before the SCL line. This constitutes a start 
condition. Then the address bits will follow, which is fol- 
lowed by a readwrite bit and then an acknowledgment bit. 
The target node can acknowledge the receipt of the data by 
holding down the acknowledgment bit. After that, eight bits 
of data can be sent followed by another acknowledgment bit. 
Data can be sent repeatedly until a stop condition occurs, in 
which the source node signals the end of transaction by a 
low-to-high transition on the SDA line while holding the 
SCL line high. 
The 12C uses collision avoidance to resolve conflicts 
between master nodes contending for the bus. If two or more 
masters try to send data to the bus, the node producing a 
‘one’ bit will lose arbitration to the node producing a ‘zero’ 
bit. The clock signals during arbitration are a synchronized 
combination of the clocks generated by the masters using the 
wired-AND connection to the SCL line. 
There are two applications of the 12C bus in this archi- 
tecture. In the system level, it is used to assist the IEEE 1394 
bus to isolate and recover from faults. In the subsystem 
level, a separate 12C bus may be used to collect engineering 
data from sensors and send commands to power switches or 
other equipment. 
The system 100 in FIG. 1 as shown has three basic types 
of nodes: flight computer, microcontroller node, and non- 
volatile memory node. The flight computer node includes a 
high-performance processor module (250 MIPS); 128 
Mbytes of local (DRAM) memory; 128 Mbytes of non- 
volatile storage for boot-up software and other spacecraft 
state data; an IiO module for interfacing with the IEEE 1394 
and 12C buses. All modules can communicate with each 
other via a 33 MHz PCI bus. The microcontroller node is 
similar to the flight computer node except the microcontrol- 
ler has lower performance and less memory to conserve 
power. It is used to interface sensors and instruments with 
the IEEE 1394 and 12C bus. The non-volatile memory node 
has four slices, each slice contains 256 Mbytes of flash 
memory and 1 Mbytes of GMRAM. The flash memory has 
much higher density and is suitable for block data storage. 
However, it has limited number of write cycles and is 
susceptible to radiation effects. The GMRAM has unlimited 
write cycles and is radiation tolerant, but its density is much 
lower than flash. The flash memory is used for software 
codes and science data storage while the GMRAM is used 
to store spacecraft state data. The non-volatile memory 
slices are controlled by a microcontroller with an IEEE 1394 
and 12C bus interfaces. 
3. Design of Composite Fault-Tolerant Link with COTS 
Buses 
The composite fault-tolerant link in the system 100 of 
FIG. 1 includes two different buses, the IEEE 1394 bus (130) 
and the 12C bus (140). This choice for the system 100 is a 
result from evaluating a variety of commercial buses, includ- 
ing IEEE 1394, Fiber Channel, Universal Serial Bus (USB), 
8 
Fast Ethernet, Serial Fiber Optic Data Bus (SFODB), ATM, 
Myrinet, FDD1, AS1773, and SPI. The IEEE 1394 bus is 
selected because of its high data rate (100, 200 or 400 
Mbps), multi-master capability, moderate power consump- 
5 tion, strong commercial support, relatively deterministic 
latency, and the availability of commercial ASIC cores 
(referred to as Intellectual Properties or IPS in industry). The 
advantages of IPS are that they are reusable and can be 
integrated in ASICs and fabricated by rad-hard foundry to 
i o  meet radiation requirements. The 12C bus is selected 
because of its low power consumption, multi-master capa- 
bility, availability ofASIC IPS, adequate data rate (100 kbps) 
for low speed data, simple protocol, and strong commercial 
support. APL has even developed a rad-hard 12C based 
Although the IEEE 1394 and 12C buses are very attractive 
in many aspects, it is recognized that they may not be ideal 
buses in the classical fault tolerance sense. The 1394 bus has 
limited fault detection features, and has no explicit fault 
20 recovery mechanisms such as built-in redundancy or cross 
strapping. In particular, the 1394 bus has a tree topology that 
can easily be partitioned by a single node or link failure. The 
12C bus has almost no built-in fault detection except an 
acknowledgement bit after every byte transfer. However, 
25 they are preferred for this particular application in the 
system 100 in FIG. 1 over the other fault-tolerant buses 
mainly because of their low cost and commercial support. 
The fault-tolerant features in the system 100 of FIG. 1 are 
designed in part to mitigate some common or critical failure 
30 modes for data buses in spacecraft avionics systems. How- 
ever, such features may also be in other failure-tolerant 
systems and may require some modifications. NASMJPL 
performs failure mode effect and criticality analysis for 
every spacecraft design. Based on those experiences, the 
35 following failure modes for data buses in avionics systems 
have been identified as either frequently occur or critical to 
the survival of the spacecraft: 
(1). Invalid Messages: Messages sent across the bus 
contain invalid data. 
(2). Non-Responsive: An expected response to a message 
does not return in time. 
(3). Babbling: Communication among nodes is blocked or 
interrupted by uncontrolled data stream. 
(4). Conflict of Node Address: More than one node has the 
same identification. 
FIG. 3 shows one embodiment of the COTS bus archi- 
tecture fault-tolerance strategy based on the multi-level 
approach outlined above. This strategy first utilizes the 
50 native fault tolerance features of the IEEE 1394 and 12C 
buses to detect occurrence of faults. An additional layer of 
fault tolerance hardware and software enhances the fault 
detection and recovery capability of each bus. For dificult 
faults, the IEEE 1394 and 12C buses assist each other to 
55 isolate and recover from the faults. The entire set of IEEE 
1394 and 12C buses are duplicated at the system level to 
provide necessary redundancy for fault recovery. 
When a fault is detected in the primary bus set, simple 
recovery procedures such as retry and bus reset may first be 
60 attempted. If the simple procedures cannot correct the prob- 
lem, then the backup set of buses may be activated and the 
system operations will be transferred to the backup bus. At 
this point, the system can have more time to diagnose the 
failed bus set and remove the faulty node or connections. 
65 The repaired bus set can then become the backup. The 
implementation of this bus architecture also allows the IEEE 
1394 and 12C buses to be switched to their backups inde- 
15 sensor interface chip. 
40 
45 
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pendently to enhance recovery flexibility. Details of each 
layer in FIG. 3 are explained as follows. 
Layer 1 : Native Fault Containment-The basic fault 
detection mechanisms of the IEEE 1394 and 12C buses such 
as CRC and acknowledgment are used to detect invalid 
messages or non-responsive failure modes. 
Layer 2: Enhanced Fault Containment-A layer of hard- 
ware and software is used to detect more difficult failure 
modes such as babbling and conflict of node addresses in the 
IEEE 1394 and 12C buses. This layer may also include some 
low-level fault recovery mechanisms in each bus. 
Layer 3: Fault Protection by Design Diversity-Since the 
IEEE 1394 bus adopts a tree topology, it can be difficult to 
isolate or recover from a failed node or link because the bus 
network is partitioned and communication between the 
sub-trees is cut off. The 12C bus is used to assist the fault 
isolation and recovery by maintaining the communication of 
all nodes. Similarly, if the shared medium of the 12C bus 
fails, the IEEE 1394 bus can be used to assist the fault 
isolation and recovery of the 12C bus. 
Layer 4: Fault Protection by System Level Redundancy 
-The entire set of IEEE 1394 and 12C buses are duplicated 
to provide redundancy for fault recovery. For long-life 
missions, only one set of the buses will be activated in 
normal operations. If one of the buses in the primary bus set 
fails, the backup set of buses will be activated and the system 
operations will be transferred to the backup buses. After that, 
the failed bus set will be diagnosed and repaired. It is worth 
to notice that even though either one of the buses in the 
primary set can be switched to its backup bus independently, 
it is preferred to have the entire bus set switched. This is 
because the system operations in the backup bus set will not 
be affected while the healthy bus (e.g., 12C bus) in the failed 
bus set is diagnosing the faulty bus (e.g., IEEE 1394 bus). 
3.1 Native fault containment regions 
Certain basic fault detection mechanisms of the IEEE 
1394 and 12C buses are highlighted in this section. 
The 1394 bus standard has a number of built-in fault 
detection mechanisms, including: 
A. Data and packet header CRCs for both isochronous and 
asynchronous transactions; 
B. Acknowledgment packets include error code to indi- 
cate if the message has been successfully delivered in 
asynchronous transactions; 
C. Parity bit to protect acknowledgment packets; 
D. Response Packets include error code to indicate if the 
requested action has been completed successfully in 
asynchronous transactions; and 
E. Built-in timeout conditions: response timeout for split 
transaction, arbitration timeout, acknowledgment tim- 
eout etc. 
A useful feature in the IEEE 1394a standard (Draft 2.0, 
March 1998) is the capability to enable or disable individual 
ports (a port is the physical interface to a link). With this 
feature, every node in the bus can disable a link connected 
to a failed node and enable a backup link to bypass the failed 
node. This feature is the basis ofthe IEEE 1394 bus recovery 
in this bus architecture. 
Another feature in the IEEE 1394 standard is the keep- 
alive of the physical layer with cable power. This feature 
allows the link layer hardware and the host processor to be 
powered off without affecting the capability of the physical 
layer to pass on messages. This is useful for insolating a 
failed processor during fault recovery. 
The 12C bus has only one fault detection mechanism 
which is the acknowledgment bit that follows every data 
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byte. When a node (master) sends data to another node 
(slave), and if the slave node is able to receive the data, it has 
to acknowledge the transaction by pulling the data line 
(SDA) to low. If the slave node fails to acknowledge, the 
5 master node will issue a stop condition to abort the trans- 
action. Similar situation can happen when the master node 
requests data from a slave node. If the master fails to 
acknowledge after receiving data from the slave, the slave 
will stop sending data. Subsequently, the master node can 
i o  issue a stop condition to terminate the transaction if it is still 
functional. 
3.2. Enhanced fault containment regions 
tion and recovery capability of the IEEE 1394 bus. 
A. Heartbeat and Polling 
Heartbeat is effective for detecting root failure while 
polling can be used to detect individual node failures. Since 
the cycle master (root) of the IEEE 1394 bus always sends 
20 out an isochronous cycle start message every 125 microsec- 
onds on the average, the cycle start message can be used as 
the heartbeat. All other nodes on the bus monitor the interval 
between cycle start messages. If the root node fails, other 
nodes on the bus will detect missing cycle start and initiate 
25 fault isolation process (to be discussed in later sections). 
However, cycle start can only detect hardware level faults 
since it is automatically generated by the link layer. There- 
fore, a software heartbeat should be used to detect faults in 
the transaction or application layers. 
Other failure modes can also be detected by this method. 
For example, multiple roots will generate more than one 
hardware heartbeat (i.e., cycle start) within an isochronous 
cycle. By comparing the actual heartbeat interval with a 
minimum expected heartbeat interval, the multiple heart- 
35 beats can be detected. More discussions about the multiple 
root detection can be found in the next two sections. 
Furthermore, software heartbeat is effective in detecting 
babbling nodes. If the fault causing the node to babble is in 
software, it is possible that the hardware heartbeat may 
40 appear to be valid since the cycle start is automatically 
generated by the link layer hardware. On the other hand, the 
software fault is likely to affect the software heartbeat. 
Therefore, the software heartbeat is preferred over the 
hardware heartbeat in detecting babbling nodes. 
In addition to heartbeat, the root node can also send 
polling messages periodically to individual nodes by asyn- 
chronous transaction. Since asynchronous transaction 
requires acknowledgment from the target node, a node 
failure can be detected by acknowledgment timeout. 
B. Isochronous Acknowledgment: 
Sometimes, acknowledgment is desirable for isochronous 
transactions, especially when the isochronous transaction 
requires on-time and reliable delivery. Therefore, a confir- 
mation message type is added to the application layer, so that 
the target node can report any isochronous transaction errors 
to the source node. The confirmation message itself can be 
either an isochronous or asynchronous transaction, depend- 
ing on the time criticality. Furthermore, the data field of the 
original isochronous message contains the source node ID, 
so the target node knows where to report the isochronous 
transaction errors. If the confirmation message contains an 
error code, the source node can retransmit the message in 
isochronous or asynchronous mode as appropriate. 
Several mechanisms are added to enhance the fault detec- 
15 
30 
45 
50 
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65 C. Link Layer Fail-Silence 
The root node of the IEEE 1394 bus periodically sends a 
“fail silence” message to all nodes; every node in the bus has 
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a fail silence timer in the link layer to monitor this message. master periodically sends a “fail silence” message to all 12C 
Upon receiving the message, each node will reset its fail nodes. All nodes will monitor this message with an 12C bus 
silence timer. If one of the nodes babbles because of a link fail silence timer. Upon receiving the message, each node 
layer or application layer failure, the fail silence message will reset its 12C bus fail silence timer. If one of the nodes 
will be blocked or corrupted. This will cause the fail silence 5 is babbling so that the fail silence message is blocked or 
timer in each node to time out. Subsequently, the fail silence delayed, the 12C bus fail-silence timer of each node will time 
timer will disable the hardware of its own link layer and thus out. Subsequently, the bus transmitters of each node will be 
inhibit the node from transmitting or receiving messages disabled to inhibit any transmission of messages. However, 
(note: the ability of the physical layer to pass on message is the bus receiver of each node is still enabled so that it can 
unaffected). Eventually, after a waiting period, the link i o  receive commands for fault recovery later on. After a 
layers of all nodes including the babbling node will be waiting period, the bus transmitters of all nodes including 
disabled and the bus will become quiet again. At this time, the babbling node will be disabled and the bus will be quiet 
another timer in the root will “unmute” the root itself and again. At this time, another timer in the controlling master 
send a Link-on packet, which is a physical layer packet, to node will “unmute” the node itself and send a message to 
individual nodes. Upon receiving the Link-on packet, the 15 re-enable the other nodes individually. If a node causes the 
physical layer of a node will send a signal to wake up its link bus to fail again while it is enabled, it will be identified as 
layer. If a node causes the bus to fail again while its link the failed node and will not be enabled again. If the root 
layer is re-enabled, it will be identified as the failed node and itself is the failed node, other backup nodes will detect the 
will not be enabled again. If the root itself is the babbling unmute timeout and promote themselves as the controlling 
node, other nodes will detect the unmute timeout and issue 20 master according to a pre-determined priority. 
3.3. Fault Protection by Design Diversity bus reset. 
D. Watchdog Timers The combination of the IEEE 1394 and 12C buses can be 
The IEEE 1394 standard has specified many watchdog used to isolate and recover from many faults that might not 
timers, Additional watchdog timers that are related to fault be possible if each bus is working alone. The failure modes 
detection of the IEEE 1394 bus have been identified as 25 that can be handled by the cooperation of the buses are 
follows. described below. 
E. CPU Watchdog Timer A. Non-Responsive Failures: 
A hardware timer to monitor the health of the host c p u  In the IEEE 1394 bus, when a node or one of its links fails 
(i.e., the microprocessor or microcontroller). This watchdog 30 in the non-responsive mode, it 
timer is an incremental counter and need to be reset by the 
CPU periodically. Ifthe CPU fails to reset this watchdog, an 
not be to respond to 
requests and messages will not be able to Pass though the 
node. The existence Of the can be detected by 
overflow will occur which then will trigger a local reset, 
F. Heartbeat Lost Timer 
Triggered by lost of heartbeat (i% the ~ ~ o c h r o n o ~ s  Cycle 
Start Packet). This is one of the native fault detection 
mechanisms in the IEEE 1394 bus standard. 
G. Poll Response Timer (in Root Node) 
A software timer monitor the response time of 
message on the 1394 bus. 
ne enhanced fault-tolerance mechanisms for 12c bus 
include the protocol enhancement, the byte timeout, and the 
fail silence. 
the 12c bus, This protoco~ includes a byte count after the 
for the system 100 in FIG. 1 also utilizes especial hardware 
messages to control critical functions, F~~ these Under these circumstances, the I2C bus can facilitate the 
messages, is sent followed by its complement to 5o communication among all the nodes. The root node will first 
provide one more layer of protection. interrogate the health of the nearest non-responsive node 
hold down the clock signal (SCL) as a to slow down not respond or if its response over the 12C bus indicates any 
the sending node (master or slave),  hi^ is to allow a fast internal or physical connection failures, then the root node 
node to send data to a slow node. However, it is possible that 55 can send 12‘ messages to the Other nodes and command 
a failed receiving node causes a stuck-at-low fault on the them to reconfigure their links to bypass the failed node. If 
SCL signal, so that the sending node may have to wait the prime suspect node is fault-free, then the root can repeat 
has a byte timeout timer to monitor the duration of the SCL nodes in separate segments. 
faulty node) expires, it will disable the circuitry ofthe SDA sive, the source node can interrogate the health of the target 
and SCL transmitters. After all nodes have disabled their node through the IEEE 1394 bus, command the target node 
SDA and SDL transmitters, a recovery procedure similar to to reset its I2C bus interface, and request the target node to 
that in the fail-silence mechanism will be used to disable the retransmit the message. 
failed node. 65 B. IEEE 1394 Bus Physical Layer Babbling 
In the Fail Silence mechanism, one of the nodes in the 12C 
is designated as the controlling master. The controlling 
the bus timeout, message re-transmission, heartbeat, or 
polling. In general, the failed node is relatively easy to 
35 isolate because all the nodes in the sub-tree under it will 
become non-responsive to the requests from the root node. 
Therefore, the prime suspect is usually the non-responsive 
node nearest to the root. However, to recover from the fault 
is not trivial because the tree topology of the bus has been 
4o partitioned in to two or three segments by the failed node. 
The nodes in each segment will not be able to communicate 
with the nodes in the other segments. Consequently, the root 
node to command the nodes in the Other 
segments to change bus topology. It might be possible to 
different link configurations to re-establish the connectivity. 
their effectiveness is 
not be 
The protocol enhancement is a layer of protocol added to 45 devise distributed algorithms So that each node can try 
and address and two CRC bytes after the data. The system design However, these usually are rather 
to prove. 
The I2C bus permits a receiving node (slave or master) to 6 . e ~  the Prime suspect) thoughthe I2c  bus. If the node does 
indefinitely. To recover from this failure mode, every node 
signal, When the byte timeout timer in a node (including the 60 
the interrogation (and recovery procedure) On the Other 
Similarly, if a node in the I 2 c  bus becomes non-respon- 
The fail-silence technique is effective to handle babbling 
failures in the 12C bus and in the link or application layers 
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in the IEEE 1394 bus. However, the physical layer of the 
IEEE 1394 bus is rather complicate and contains state 
machines, it is possible that a transient fault would cause it 
to babble. A particular dangerous type of babbling is the 
continuous reset because any node in the IEEE 1394 bus is 
able to issue bus reset. Such failures cannot be handled by 
fail-silence. It is because if the physical layer is silenced, it 
will not be able to pass on messages and thus cause bus 
partitioning. In this case, each node can check its own 
physical layer (e.g., read the physical layer registers). If the 
physical layer is faulty, the processor of the node can issue 
a physical layer reset to correct the problem. However, if the 
physical layer fault is permanent, then the node has to 
inform the root node via the 12C bus. Subsequently, the root 
node can command other nodes via the 12C bus to recon- 
figure the bus topology to bypass the failed node. 
C. Conflict of Node Addresses 
The address of any node in the IEEE 1394 or 12C buses 
can be corrupted by permanent fault or single event upset. If 
the faulty address coincides with an existing node address, 
any read transaction to that address will be corrupted by bus 
conflict from the two nodes, and any write transaction will 
go to both nodes and may have unpredictable consequences. 
Hence, it is difficult to disable the fault node by the bus itself 
alone. However, with the redundant IEEE 1394iI2C bus set, 
this kind of failures can be handled through using one bus to 
disable a faulty node on the other bus, so that the erroneously 
duplicated node address can be eliminated. 
3.4. Fault Protection by System Level Redundancy 
The COTS bus set is duplicated to provide system level of 
fault protection. In addition, the duplicated bus set is not 
identically configured as its counter part. FIG. 2 illustrates 
one example that the IEEE 1394 bus in one bus set and the 
IEEE 1394 in its duplicate bus set connect the same node at 
different positions in their respective trees in a “stack-tree’’ 
Under catastrophic failure conditions such as bus power 
failure, both COTS bus sets may fail such that all commu- 
nications among the nodes can be lost. To re-establish the 
communication, each node can execute a distributed recov- 
ery procedure that consists of a sequence of link enable/ 
disable activities. The enabled links of all the nodes in each 
step of the procedure forms a bus configuration. If the 
critical nodes of the system can communicate with each 
other in one of the bus configurations, further fault recovery 
procedures can follow. Unfortunately, this approach usually 
requires reasonably tight synchronization among all the 
nodes, which is very difficult to achieve when all bus 
communications are lost. Furthermore, since the cause of the 
catastrophic failure may not be within the avionics system, 
the distributed recovery procedure may not succeed. There- 
fore, this approach may be used as the last recourse. 
4. Detailed Examples Based on Stack-Tree Topology 
The tree topology for the IEEE bus may be topologically 
simple so that it can be easily maintained as nodes are added 
to or deleted from the system for easy testing and integra- 
tion. FIG. 4 shows one embodiment of a stack-tree topology 
400, where a node is either a flight computer or a device. 
Three physical layer ports may be implemented in each 
node. For each branch node, two or more of these ports are 
connected to other nodes. A leaf node has only one port that 
is connected to another node. FIG. 5 shows more detailed 
node connections of the system 100 in FIG. 1 in such a 
stack-tree topology. 
The stack-tree topology shown in FIG. 4 is not fault 
tolerant because any single node or link failure can result in 
tree partitioning such that fault-tolerant routing will not be 
topology. 
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possible. In addition, it can be difficult to duplicate and 
cross-strap nodes for bus network fault tolerance purpose 
due to the constraints on power and massivolume in certain 
applications such as space flight missions. However, the 
5 IEEE 1394a standard provides a “port-disable’’ feature to 
allow a 1394-compliant, reconfigurable bus architecture 
which can be used for fault tolerance. 
4.1. Stack-Tree based Bus Architecture 
Definition 1 A stack tree is a tree where each branch node 
is connected to at most three other nodes among which at 
most two are branch nodes. 
FIGS. 6(a)-6(4 show exemplary trees. FIGS. 6(a),  6(c) 
and 6 ( 4  are stack trees while that in FIG. 6(b) is not because 
15 as the right node at the first level below the root is connected 
to three branch nodes, one of which is the root node. 
Definition 2 A complete stack tree is a stack tree where each 
branch node is connected to at least one leaf node. 
FIG. 6(c) depicts a complete stack tree (CST) with n 
2o branch nodes. This topology will be referred to as simplex 
complete stack tree (CSTs). Note that the nodes are labeled 
such that the branch nodes have the ID numbers from 1 to 
n, while the leaf nodes have the ID numbers from n+l to 2n. 
This labeling scheme will be used in the remainder of the 
25 paper. Further, we use n, the number of branch nodes in a 
CST, to denote the size of the tree. Note also that the trees 
in FIGS. 6(c) and 6 ( 4  are both CST,. Based on the CST in 
FIG. 6(c),  the CST mirror-image can be defined as follows. 
3o Definition 3 The mirror-image of a complete stack tree is a 
tree obtained by (I) removing the edges connecting the 
branch nodes with the ID numbers i and j which satisfy the 
relation li-jl=l; (2) adding edges to connect the leaf nodes 
with the ID numbers k and 1 which satisfy the relation 
Clearly, the CST shown in FIG. 6 ( 4  is a mirror image of 
that nodes in FIG. 6(c).  It is worth to note that, if we connect 
2n a CST-based network and its mirror image, then the two 
networks will not have any branch nodes in common. 
It is desirable to make the system shown in FIG. 1 scalable 
and gracefully degradable. Accordingly, a fault-tolerant bus 
network architecture may be designed to allow all the 
surviving nodes in the bus network to remain connected in 
the presence of node failures, without requiring spare nodes. 
The fact that a CST and its mirror image do not have branch 
nodes in common implies that losing a branch node in one 
tree will not partition its mirror image. 
FIG. 7A shows a dual bus scheme comprising a CST and 
its mirror image (denoted as CSTD). This scheme can be 
effective in tolerating single or multiple node failures given 
50 that I) the failed nodes are of the same type (all branch or all 
leaf) with respect to one of the complete stack trees (FIG. 
7B), or 2) the failed nodes involve both branch and leaf 
nodes but they form a cluster at either end (or both ends) of 
a CST, which will not affect the connectivity of the remain- 
We use terminal clustered branch-leaf failures to refer to 
the second failure pattern. Thus, for the cases which involve 
only the above failure patterns, all the surviving nodes will 
remain connected (no network partitioning). On the other 
60 hand, if a branch node and a leaf node in a CSTD based 
network fail in a form other than terminal clustered branch- 
leaf failure (FIG. 7D), both the primary and mirror image 
will be partitioned. 
Next, another tree structure with backup links is exam- 
65 ined. The IEEE 1394 port-disable feature enables the physi- 
cal connections between the physical layer of a node and the 
serial bus cable to become “invisible” from the view point 
10 . 
35 lk-ll=l. 
40 
45 
55 der of the tree (FIG. 7C). 
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of the reminder of the bus network. The implication is the 
following: 
1) By using disabled ports, backup connections between 
nodes can be added without forming loops (recall that 
loops are prohibited by IEEE 1394), wherein a “backup 
connection” is defined as a serial bus cable that con- 
nects (via disabled ports) two nodes which are not 
expected to have a direct connection in the original 
network configuration (differing from connection rep- 
lication); and 
2) Upon fault detection, by disabling physical ports, a 
failed node will be allowed to be isolated from the rest 
of the bus network, and necessary backup link(s)can be 
activated (by enabling the corresponding ports) to 
repair the partitioned network such that messages can 
be routed in a reconfigured network, bypassing the 
failed node. 
FIG. SA shows a bus network based on the CSTs topology 
with n branch nodes (size n). If a backup link is added 
between any two leaf nodes labeled i and j which satisfy the 
relation I(i mod n)-(i mod n)l=l, and another backup link is 
added to connect branch nodes 1 and n, then a topology as 
shown in FIG. 8B is obtained (an instantiation of the 
topology with n=6). Because the added connections (dashed 
edges) are of inactive nature, the bus network remains free 
of loop and thus complies with the IEEE 1394 tree topology 
criterion. 
FIG. 8C illustrates the bus network from a 3-dimensional 
ring-like configuration. Accordingly, this bus network con- 
figuration is denoted as CSTR. 
Definition 4 A failed branch node i and a failed leaf node j 
in a CST, a based network of size n will form a cut-type 
failure if I(i mod n)-(i mod n)lcl. 
FIGS. 9A, 9B, 9C, and 9D illustrate the concepts of 
cut-type and non cut-type failures. Specifically, the failure 
comprised by nodes 2 and 9 in FIG. 9A, and that by nodes 
5 and 11 in FIG. 9B are cut-type failures. On the other hand, 
the node failures shown in FIGS. 9C and 9D are non cut-type 
failures. Further, the term clustered failure will be used to 
refer to the failure of a group of nodes which are adjacent to 
each other. 
FIGS. 9E and 9F illustrate the scenarios of clustered and 
non-clustered multiple cut-type failures, respectively. 
Clearly, while the non-clustered cut-type failures shown in 
FIG. 9F leads to bus network partitioning (Le., the traffic 
across either of the “cuts” are disabled), the clustered 
cut-type failures shown in FIG. 9E does not even if node 6 
also fails (i.e., the traffic across the clustered “cuts” can be 
re-routed through the enabled backup links { l ,  6) or 
{7,12}), although both scenarios involve multiple cut-type 
failures. The above discussion shows the necessary and 
sufficient condition for partitioning a CST, based bus net- 
work. Hence, a bus network based on the CST, topology 
will be partitioned if and only if there exist multiple cut-type 
failures which do not constitute a single cluster. 
FIGS. 10A, 10B, and 1OC illustrate partitioning in a 
network that originally has a CST, structure. FIG. 10A 
shows that the first cut-type failure (single or clustered) will 
break the ring structure so that the remainder of the network 
becomes a CST, based structure with backup links (FIG. 
10B). The second cut-type failure (single or clustered) will 
break the CST, based structure, resulting in network parti- 
tioning as shown in FIG. lOC, in which the communication 
between any two nodes separated by the “cut” becomes 
impossible. 
FIG. 11 shows an example of the simplified fault-tolerant 
architecture in which the CSTR based bus network 
described above is implemented. The solid and dashed thick 
lines marked “1394 Bus” represent the active and backup 
16 
links, respectively. During normal operation, the active 
connections are driven by enabled ports while the ports of 
backup connections are disabled to avoid loops. The thin 
lines marked “I2C Bus” correspond to the interface for fault 
detection, isolation and reconfiguration. The 12C bus is a 
very simple low-speed multi-drop bus and used only for 
protecting the 1394 bus. Hence this engineering bus has very 
low utilization and power consumption. For additional pro- 
tection, a redundant bus (consisting of the 1394 and 12C 
buses) which is a mirror image of the configuration shown 
in FIG. 9 is proposed by our design [9J]. For clarity of 
illustration, the connections of the redundant bus are not 
shown in the figure. 
4.2. Bus Network Reliability Evaluation 
The bus network reliability can be defined as the prob- 
ability that, through a mission duration t, the network 
remains in a state in which all the surviving nodes are 
connected. The causes of a node failure may include physi- 
cal layer failure, link layer failure and CPU failure. More- 
20 over, while redundant links (serial bus cables) are permitted 
in the present architecture, it is assumed herein that dupli- 
cated nodes and cross-strap nodes for bus network fault 
tolerance purpose are not allowed due to the power and 
massivolume constraints. As a result, the likelihood of node 
Hence, under the above conditions, the following reliabil- 
ity assessment will focus on only node failure. It is also 
assumed that, when a node fails, there is a possibility that the 
faulty node may go undetected, or the corresponding net- 
work reconfiguration process (including port disablingien- 
30 abling, etc.) may unexpectedly crash the system. The 
complement of the probability of such an event is called 
“coverage.” 
Reliability models can be developed for the three com- 
plete stack tree structures discussed above. See, Tai et al., 
35 “COTS-Based Fault Tolerance in Deep Space: Qualitative 
and Quantitative Analyses of A Bus Network Architecture” 
in Proceedings of the 4th IEEE International Symposium on 
High Assurance Systems Engineering, Washington D.C., 
November 1999. The Reliability measures for the bus net- 
40 works based on CSTs, CSTD and CSTR are evaluated with 
respect to the node failure rate h, size of bus network n and 
mission duration t (in hours). 
FIG. 12 depicts the reliability of the three tree structures 
as functions of component node failure rate h. In this 
45 evaluation, the size of the CST-based bus networks, n, is set 
to 16 (a 32-node network), the fault detection and recon- 
figuration coverage c is set to 0.9999 (which is conservative 
as the coverage is defined on a single node basis), and 
mission duration t is set to 90,000 hours (which implies an 
5o over 10-year long-life mission). It can be observed that, 
while CSTD results in an appreciable amount of improve- 
ment from CSTs, CSTR leads to significantly more reliabil- 
ity gain. The quantitative results show that REST will be 
greater than 0.999997 if node failure rate lo-’ or lower. On 
the other hand, when h is higher than the reliability 
55 numbers for both CSTS and CSTD rapidly drop and become 
unacceptable but the reliability for CSTR remains relatively 
steady. 
FIG. 13 shows the results of the evaluation for which h is 
set to t and c remain 90,000 hours and 0.9999, 
6o respectively, while n becomes a variable parameter. It is 
interesting to note that the reliability for CSTD is equal to 
that for the CSTR when n=2. This is a reasonable result 
because for a 4-node network, the node failure patterns that 
will partition a CSTD-based network coincide with the 
65 failure patterns that will partition a CSTR-based network. It 
can also be observed that the reliability improvement by 
CSTR from CSTD becomes more significant as the size of 
10 . 
15 
25 failure is significantly greater than that of link failure. 
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the network increases. This is because more routing alter- 
natives that are comprised by active and backup links are 
available in a larger CSTR based network. 
FIG. 14 illustrates the evaluation results of a study for 
which and n are Set to and 16, respectively, and C 5 
remains 0.9999, while mission duration t becomes a variable 
parameter. Apparently, the reliability results for both CSTS 
and CSTD become unacceptable for long-life missions. On 
the other hand, the reliability for the CSTR remains reason- 
able at about 0.999929 even when t=100,000 (a mission 
duration about 1 I. 5 years). 
The above disclosure only includes a few embodiments. 
However, it is understood that variations and enhancements 
may be made. For example, the examples are based on wired 
buses but various features may be implemented with other 
types of communication channels for data transmission, 15 
such as wireless links in either RF or optical frequencies or 
other wired links such as optical fiber links. All these and 
claims. 
wherein said tree topology includes n branch nodes in 
which each of a first branch node 1 and a nth branch 
node n is connected to only two other nodes, and each 
branch node in said tree topology is connected to (1) at 
most three other nodes among which at most two nodes 
are branch nodes and (2) at least one leaf node; and 
a plurality of backup buses of said first type which are 
connected to selected nodes in said tree topology and 
are not activated in absence of a failure, wherein a 
backup link is connected between said branch nodes 1 
and n and a backup link is connected between any two 
leaf nodes i and j which satisfy I(i mod n)-(i mod n)l=l. 
5. A 
a Plurality of digital electronic node devices which 
include at least one computer; 
a first set of buses of a first type to connect each and every 
of said node devices to form a first network with a first 
a second set of buses of a different, second type to connect 
each and every of said node devices to form a second 
network with a second topology which is different from 
said first topology, wherein said first and said second 
topologies are selected to be complementary to each 
other so that a single-point failure causing a partition in 
one of said first and said second network does not cause 
a partition in another of said first and said second 
network; 
every of said node devices to form a third network with 
a third topology; and 
and every of said node devices to form a fourth network 
with a fourth topology which is different from said third 
wherein said third and fourth networks are operable to 
back up said first and said second networks, wherein 
each of said first and said third topologies is a tree 
topology, and where a branch node for one tree topol- 
ogy is not a branch node for another tree topology. 
6. A method, comprising: 
connecting node devices by a first set of communication 
links of a first type to form a first tree topology; 
connecting said node devices by a second set of commu- 
nication links of said first type to form a second tree 
topology, wherein a branch node in said first tree 
topology is not a branch node in said second tree 
connecting said node devices by a third set of communi- 
others are intended to be encompassed by the following topology; 
The invention claimed is: 
1. A system, comprising: 
a plurality of node devices, each operable to transmit or 
receive information; and 
a first set of composite communication links to connect 
said node devices to form a communication network, 25 
each composite communication link having at least a 
communication channel of a first type and a commu- 
nication channels of said first type connected to said 
nodes to form a first network in a first topology and 30 
to said nodes to form a second network in a second, 
different topology, 
wherein at least one of said first and said second networks 
is not partitioned when a single node failure occurs 
wherein a node having a node position in said first 
network has a different node position in said second 
network, 
wherein each of said first and said second topologies is a 
tree topology, and wherein a branch node in said first 40 
network is not a branch node in said second network. 
2. The system as in claim 1, wherein communication 
3. The system as in claim 1, wherein communication 
4. A system, comprising: 
a plurality of digital electronic node devices which 
include at least one computer; 
a first set of buses of a first type to connect each and 
2o 
nication Of a different, second type, a third set of buses of said first type to connect each and 
communication Of said second type connected a fourth set of buses of said second type to connect each 
toPologY, 
35 
channels of said first type include IEEE 1394 buses. 
channels of said second type include 12C buses. 45 
topology; 
every of said node devices to form a first network 50 cation links Of a second type to form a first multi-drop 
serial topology; 
nication links of said second type to form a second 
multi-drop serial topology; 
operating said first and said third sets of communication 
links to detect and bypass a failure location; and 
operating said second and said fourth sets of Communi- 
cation links to back up said first and said third sets of 
communication links. 
7. The method as in claim 6, wherein an IEEE 1394 bus 
is used for each communication link of said first type and an 
12C bus is used for each communication link of said second 
type. 
with a first topology; 
connect each and every of said node devices to form 
a second network with a second topology which is 
different from said first topology, 
wherein said first and said second topologies are selected to 
be complementary to each other so that a single-point failure 
causing a partition in one of said first and said second 
network does not cause a partition in another of said first and 
said second network, 
wherein said first topology includes a tree topology and 
said second topology includes a multi-drop serial topol- 
ogy, wherein each node device has three ports desig- 
nated for connections to other node devices in said tree 
a second set of buses of a different, second type to connecting said node device by a fourth set Of commu- 
55 
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topology, * * * * *  
